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Abstract
Burnside and Dollar (2000) (BD) ignite a policy debate by claiming that foreign aid works
only in good policy environments. This result, however, has been criticized by a number of
studies on numerous statistical grounds concluding that the BD result is too fragile. I revisit
the aid-growth relationship using Bayesian Model Averaging techniques to account for
uncertainty issues regarding model specification. I find that the data evidence does not
support the claim that aid works only in good policy environments. My analysis also suggests
that aid flows are not very effective in boosting growth regardless of the quality of the policy
environment.
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Aid-growth relationship is one of politically-charged topics in the economic growth 
literature, as not only could donor countries potentially use aid to further some 
political and strategic goals, but also they are accountable for the allocation of 
limited resources paid for by their taxpayers. The literature on the efficacy foreign 
aid, however, is far from settled. The importance of the answer to the question of 
the effectiveness of foreign aid mainly stems from the fact that it has practical 
implications in the allocation of aid resources. For instance, are selectivity and 
conditionality justified in the allocation of aid resources? That is, what are (or 
should be) the consequences of the relationship between aid and growth on the 
management of aid flows? In this paper, I revisit this relationship and try to shed 
some light on the current policy debates on the management of aid flows.  
 
Empirical studies
1 on the subject have come up with a range of answers for the 
relationship between aid and growth. Boone (1996) finds a negative relationship 
between aid and growth refueling the discussions of aid efficacy. He concludes 
that foreign aid seems to finance consumption rather than boosting growth in the 
recipient countries. Burnside and Dollar (2000), Burnside and Dollar (2004), 
Collier and Dollar (2002) find that aid efficacy is closely related to the 
macroeconomic policies followed by the country in question. Their analyses 
indicate that foreign aid is more effective in boosting growth in countries with 
better macroeconomic policies as opposed to countries with “bad” policies. 
Hansen and Tarp (2001) as well as McPherson (2000), Dalgaard and Hansen 
(2005), Dayton-Johnson and Hoddinott (2003), Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), 
Lensink and White (1999), Lu and Ram (2001), Akhand and Gupta (2002) and 
Easterly et al. (2004), to name a few, however, oppose these results on statistical 
grounds and provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis that aid raises growth 
regardless of the quality of the policy environment.  
 
The fragility of the Burnside and Dollar (2000) (BD hereinafter) results to different 
datasets, estimation methods, and even to different definitions of aid and policy 
measures have been shown (Easterly et al. (2004).) In this paper, I essentially 
check the sensitivity of the BD results to different model specifications. I utilize 
Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA hereinafter) techniques to address and tackle 
uncertainty issues regarding model specification. That is, do the BD results highly 
depend on the set of control variables used in the estimations? BMA is a 
statistically appealing technique that has been drawing more attention particularly 
with the advancement of computational power and techniques.  
 
When I employ BMA techniques to take into account uncertainty issues regarding 
model specification, I find that the coefficient of the interaction term between aid 
and policies is too sensitive to the model specification. Its posterior standard 
                                                 
1For a literature review see Dalgaard et al. (2004). 
 deviation is too great relative to its mean and, hence, “insignificant.” In other 
words, the data evidence does not support the hypothesis that aid works in good 
policy environments. This is an important result considering that conditionality 
and selectivity have tremendous effect on the behavior of international financial 
institutions and donors. This behavior, however, may not be supported by the 
data.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some plausible 
theoretical channels through which aid impacts growth. I explain the methodology 
in Section 3 and report and discuss results in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 
concludes.  
2. Theory 
The standard theoretical model in the literature to investigate the relationship 
between aid and growth has been the two-gap model of Chenery and Strout 
(1966). The gaps referred to in the model are the differences between: i) 
domestic savings and the necessary level of investment to achieve a certain rate 
of growth; ii) foreign exchange receipts and the level of imports required to reach 
a certain level of production. The two-gap model has been extended into three-
gap model by Bacha (1990) to include the government’s fiscal position as 
another possible gap. It is assumed that at any point given in time at least one of 
the gaps is binding. For instance, if we assume that domestic savings-investment 
gap is binding, then foreign aid fill the gap and help the economy grow at a 
higher rate. Obviously, this conclusion is based on the premise that foreign aid 
actually finances investment rather than consumption and investment is 
productive. In order for foreign aid to be channeled into investment, the 
incentives to invest as opposed to consume must be there. As Easterly (2003) 
puts it, to have a positive link between aid and economic growth, foreign aid must 
go into investment and that investment must be productive. Conceivably, the 
degree of the efficacy of foreign aid highly depends on the extent to which the 
above assumptions hold.  
 
Another problem with the two-gap model is the Leontief-style production function. 
More recent models of aid consider Solow-type growth models with Cobb-
Douglas production function. The Solow model, however, does not offer a stable, 
linear relationship between aid and growth. As an alternative to the neoclassical 
growth models endogenous growth models draw attention, which take into 
account intermediate goods, social and institutional factor as well as more 
traditional inputs. Some social, institutional and environmental factors are 
controlled for in the empirical studies as they potentially shift the production 
function (Hall and Jones (1999).) 
 
Theoretically, foreign aid might have effects on growth similar to the effects of 
natural resources. One of these channels through which aid can have impact on 
economic growth is its impact on political institutions. Foreign aid can undermine 
democratic process as it reduces the accountability of a government. If the government relies on tax receipts as opposed to aid, it must be responsive to the 
demands by the citizens. By eliminating this part of the process, aid can 
deteriorate institutions. Poor institutions are associated with poor macroeconomic 
policies, which, in turn, hamper growth.  
 
Unrequited aid flows can generate so-called “the transfer paradox.” That is, 
theoretically, aid flows can leave the country worse off than before. This is 
closely related to the “Dutch disease effect” of aid flows and might prevail as 
follows. Foreign aid very generally accrues to the public sector and the economic 
impact of aid flows highly depends on what the government does with aid. If 
either the public or the private sector spends the gift on imported goods, there 
will not be any macroeconomic effects. The government can possibly transfer the 
aid receipts to the private sector directly or through tax cuts, or in the form of 
increased expenditure. Regardless of the form, it is very likely that in response to 
the aid flows domestic demand will rise. Unless there is considerable excess 
supply in the economy, real exchange rate or the prices of domestically produced 
goods and services must increase in the short run.  
 
The medium-run effects, however, depend on the supply side response. The 
response of the supply side is determined by how aid inflows are utilized to build 
on the productive capacity of the economy and how the supply side responds to 
those changes. One of the possible scenarios is that the excess demand in the 
non-tradable sector is met by attracting some labor and capital from the export 
sector. The inter-sectoral reallocation of resources away from the export into 
non-tradable sector results in a shrinking export sector. This hurts the growth 
prospects as the traditional export sector is by and large characterized by 
relatively high productivity gains. Also, if the resulting expansion in the sector is 
strong relative to the growth in domestic demand, the prices of non-tradables fall. 
This generates the possibility that the real income may go down for a small open 
economy, if the prices fall down enough. This phenomenon is called “the transfer 
paradox."  
3. Methodology 
Uncertainty issues regarding model specification is an important problem in the 
empirical growth literature and have been acknowledged and looked into by 
Brock and Durlauf (2001), Brock et al. (2003), and Doppelhofer et al. (2004), to 
name a few. The particular context I am interested in obviously is not immune to 
this problem. As Easterly (2003) points out  
 ...These papers conduct variations on the Burnside and Dollar 
specification (some of which had already figured in the earlier literature), 
introducing variables such as aid squared, terms of trade shocks, 
variability of agricultural output and exports and even such complicated 
terms as an interactive term combining aid with terms of trade shocks. 
Some of these papers confirm the message of Burnside and Dollar that 
aid only works in a good policy environment, while others find that when 
particular variables are added, the coefficient on the interaction between aid and policy becomes near-zero and/or statistically insignificant. This 
literature has limitations: how to choose the appropriate specification 
without guidance from theory, which often means there are more plausible 
right-hand side variables than there are data points in the sample...   
 
In order to tackle the uncertainty issues regarding model specification, I closely 
follow Eris (2004) which draws from Brock et al. (2003), and Doppelhofer et al. 
(2004). I employ BMA techniques to average across all possible models rather 
than specifying and estimating one or a small set of models. BMA is a statistically 
coherent way to account for model uncertainty based on the premise that the 
posterior distribution of a quantity of interest conditional on the observed data 
and the class of models is the weighted average of the posterior distributions of 
that quantity by posterior model probabilities under each model considered. That 
is,  
  () ( ) ( ) kk
k
DD M M D μμ μ Δ|= Δ | , | ∑  (1) 
where  Δ is the quantity of interest,  i M ’s,  1 i… κ = ,, , are the models considered. 
All the terms in the above equation are also implicitly conditional on the class of 
models considered. I further assume that the true model is in the class of models 
considered.  
In order to be able to compute the quantities in the above equation, I still need to 
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The posterior mean and variance of the quantity of interest Δ are given by  
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and  
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I specify a uniform prior over the model space. I adopt a fully Bayesian approach 
over the model space and the parameter space conditional on the model. I follow 
Fernandez et al. (2001a) in terms of the statistical model. I refer the reader to 
those studies which discuss this aspect in greater detail.  
4. Data 
I employ a dataset based on Hansen and Tarp (2001) as their data allow me to 
carry out empirical analysis which will be comparable to the prominent studies in 
the context.  
 The original data are a panel of 27 variables2 (including the dependent variable) 
for 56 countries covering the period 1970 through 1993.  
 
The dependent variable is the average rate of growth during the period covered 
by the sample. Official development assistance as a share of GDP is the 
measure of aid flows. The initial level of income and infant mortality rates are 
also included in the dataset3.  
 
The number of assassinations per 100,000 and the ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization index are included to capture the effects of political and social 
conditions on growth. The ICRGE index of Knack and Keefer (1995) is included 
to account for institutional variation across countries. A number of human capital 
proxies are included in the dataset as well. The average years of schooling at 
primary, secondary and tertiary levels as well as their totals provide us with the 
data to measure the human capital stock. The logarithm of the average 
population is included to account for possible scale effects. That is, do countries 
of (population-wise) different sizes exhibit different growth behavior? Some 
regional and country dummies and arms imports are included as additional 
control variables.  
 
First, I transform the data into pure cross-section by calculating the averages of 
the variables over the period in question except for the initial level of income and 
initial level of infant mortality variables. I then go on to use that data to run the 
estimations. In the process, I create higher order terms for aid and policy 
variables by taking the appropriate powers of aid and the interactions of aid and 
policy variables. Following the other studies in the literature, I create and use the 
quadratic form of aid and its interaction with the policy variable. This, in effect, 
allows one to test whether there is decreasing returns to aid.  
5. Results and Discussion 
I estimate more parsimonious versions of the BD specifications while accounting 
for model uncertainty using BMA. One of the criticisms BD has received is the 
sensitivity of their results to alternative definitions of “policy." Therefore, I 
experiment with different policy measures as I reexamine the BD results.  
 
The first policy measure employed is an index. It is a weighted average of budget 
surplus, inflation and the openness index (Sachs and Warner (1995)). As 
Dalgaard et al. (2004) argue, a single index for policy potentially results in an 
ambiguous effect of aid on a good policy environment. For instance, if aid flows 
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well as the list of the countries included in the sample are given in the Appendix. 
 
3These variables are always included in the models along with the constant term 
constituting a benchmark model. 
 are used to mitigate conflicts through redistribution, worse performance in terms 
of budget surplus could plausibly translate into higher growth. On the other hand, 
one would expect that open economies with stable prices exhibit better growth 
performance, everything else being equal.  
 
The model averaging exercise with the BD policy index gives insignificant 
estimates for the coefficient of the aid-policy interaction variable. As reported in 
Table 1, the interaction term has a posterior mean of 0.007. Its posterior standard 
deviation, however, is too high relative to its mean. One can check the strength 
of data evidence by looking at the Bayes factors (see Kass and Raftery (1995), 
Eris (2004) for instance.) Compared to its prior inclusion probability of 0.5, the 
posterior inclusion probability of the interaction term is too low at 0.087. Hence, 
the data evidence does not support the inclusion of this variable in the 
regressions.  
 
In addition to the BD policy index, I experiment with the openness index of Sachs 
and Warner (1995), inflation, budget surplus, and M2 as a share of GDP. The 
estimates are essentially very similar to the estimates with the BD policy index4. 
In particular, the openness index which is highly correlated with the BD index 
yields almost identical results.  
 
It is interesting to note that the coefficient of the aid variable itself is not 
significant, either. That is, its posterior standard deviation is too high relative to its 
posterior mean. Also, the posterior inclusion probability is less than its prior 
inclusion probability of 0.5, which translates into a less than unity Bayes factor.  
 
My findings are in line with the findings of the critics of BD. In particular, I confirm 
the conclusions drawn by Easterly et al. (2004) which point out the sensitivity of 
BD results to alternative measures of the variables of interest as well as to 
different datasets.  
 
Another interesting result is that the aid variable has a negative coefficient 
despite the fact that it has a relatively large posterior standard deviation and the 
posterior inclusion probabilities are also too low to warrant the inclusion of the aid 
variable in the regressions.  
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
6. Conclusion 
The aid-growth nexus has been of great interest and a source of more recent and 
salient policy debates in the growth literature. Particularly, the question of the 
importance of the interaction between aid flows and policies followed has crucial 
consequences. BD investigate this relationship and find a positive relationship 
between the quality of policies and the efficacy of aid flows. That is, countries 
                                                 
4The estimates are available upon request. with better institutions and policies do a better job of utilizing foreign aid and 
transforming foreign help into better growth performance.  
 
This empirical result has been challenged by many, though it is intuitively 
appealing. A number of studies5 show that the BD result is not robust. Altering 
the definitions of the concepts of aid and policy, different samples and time 
periods and different estimation methods yield different results.  
 
In this paper, I conduct an empirical exercise with the Hansen and Tarp dataset 
and original BD variables to show that if one accounts for uncertainty regarding 
model specification, the BD results do not hold up. In other words, the data 
evidence does not support the claim that there is a robust relationship between 
good polices and the higher efficacy of aid flows in terms of good growth 
performance.  
 
This is an important result for the policy makers and international financial 
institutions, which increasingly favor conditionality and selectivity in the allocation 
of aid resources. The allocation of aid resources based on the BD result may be 
especially costly for LDC’s in terms of poverty reduction, if some of the aid goes 
into consumption by the poor. My results also advocate the development of 
alternative mechanisms for aid as aid flows currently have a dubious effect on 
the growth performance of the recipients.  
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7. APPENDIX 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
[TABLE 3 HERE] Table 1. Posterior estimates with the BD policy index. 
 
Variable   Posterior  
 Mean  Standard 
Error  
Inclusion 
Probability   
const   0.016  0.024   1.000  
oda   -0.018  0.075   0.126   
ethnf   -0.001  0.007   0.094   
assassin   5E-05  0.003   0.043   
icrge   0.005  0.002   0.885  
policy   0.008  0.003   0.891   
gdi   0.082  0.039   0.721   
fdi   0.003  0.290   0.041   
mytotl   3E-05  0.002   0.041   
armslag   -E-04  2E-04   0.245   
lpop   4E-04  0.002   0.131   
oda2   -0.008  0.324   0.057   
oda*policy   0.007  0.052   0.087   
oda2*policy   0.012  0.272   0.058   
ssa   -0.018  0.005   0.898   
easia   0.001  0.007   0.105   
lac   -2E-04  0.005   0.05   
cac   -E-04  0.007   0.04   
francz   4E-04  0.008   0.059   




Table 2. The list of countries included in the sample. 
 
Algeria               Indonesia             Tunisia   
Argentina            Mali                  Turkey   
Bolivia               Kenya                 Uruguay              
Botswana            Korea                 Venezuela  
Brazil                Madagascar         Zaire   
Cameroon           Malawi                Zambia                
Chile                 Malaysia              Zimbabwe           
Colombia            Mexico                Niger                 
Costa Rica          Morocco               Syrian Arab 
Republic   
Dominican 
Republic   
Nicaragua            Sierra 
Leone          
Ecuador              Nigeria               Somalia               
El Salvador         Pakistan              Togo                  
Ethiopia              Paraguay             Trinidad and 
Tobago   
Ghana                 Peru                  Gabon                 
Guatemala          Philippines           Gambia        
Haiti                 Senegal               Guyana               
Honduras            Sri Lanka             Egypt                 
India                 Tanzania              Cote d’Ivoire        
Jamaica              Thailand               
 Table 3. The list of variables and their original sources. 
Variable   Description   Source  
growth   Average growth rate of real GDP per capita.   WDI (1997)  
lgdppc   Initial level of real GDP per capita   WDI (1997) 
oda   Official development assistance as a share of GDP   OECD (1998)  
ethnf   Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, 1960   Easterly and Levine (1997)  
assasin   Number of assassinations per 100,000 population   Easterly and Levine (1997)  
icrge   Institutional quality; security of property rights and efficiency   Knack and Keefer (1995)  
  of the government bureaucracy    
M2lag   M2 as a share of GDP, lagged one period   Burnside and Dollar (2000)  
fiscal   Budget surplus as a share of GDP   Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
infl   Log differences of CPI   Burnside and Dollar (2000)  
open   Dummy variable for trade openness   Sachs and Warner (1995)  
policy   Policy = 1.28 + 6.85 Budget surplus -1.4 Inflation + 2.16 Openness   Burnside and Dollar (2000)  
govcon   Government consumption as a share of GDP   Burnside and Dollar (2000)  
gdi   Gross domestic investment as a share of GDP   WDI (1997) 
fdi   Foreign direct investment as a share of GDP   WDI (1997) 
mypr   Mean school years of education at the primary level   Nehru et al. (1995)  
mysc   Mean school years of education at the secondary level   Nehru et al. (1995)  
mytr   Mean school years of education at the tertiary level   Nehru et al. (1995)  
mytotl   Mean school years of education at the primary, secondary, and tertiary level   Nehru et al. (1995)  
ssa   Dummy variable for Sub-Saharan Africa    
easia   Dummy variable for East-Asia    
lac   Dummy variable for Latin America    
cac   Dummy variable for Central America    
francz   Dummy variable for Franc Zone    
Egypt   Dummy variable for Egypt    
armslag   Arms imports, lagged one period   Burnside and Dollar (2000)  
lpop   log of population   WDI (1997) 
imrt   Initial level of infant mortality   WDI (1997) 